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Abstract
Convergence in information technology has made bundling as a key business
strategy and policy makers are very interested in knowing how bundling affects
competition in the IT sector. For instances, does bundling build barrier to entry?
Does head-to-head competition between bundles generate more consumer surplus
than competition among individual products? Furthermore, switching cost is quite
important in the IT sector. In this paper, we revisit the two questions in a framework
in which consumers have heterogeneous switching costs. First, when we consider
an incumbent facing n specialist entrants, we find that the incumbents bundling
always increases its own profit. In addition, it reduces each entrants profit if and
only if consumers are heterogeneous enough in terms of switching cost. However, as
n goes to infinite, each entrants profit converges to zero regardless of the degree of
homogeneity. Second, when we consider an incumbent facing a generalist entrant
producing n products, we find that competition between bundles generates higher
consumer surplus than competition among individual products if and only if con-
sumers are heterogeneous enough in terms of switching cost. As n increases, the
zone in which bundling increases consumers’ surplus shrinks.
1 Introduction
Does bundling build a barrier to entry? Does head-to-head competition between bundles
improve consumers’ surplus compared to competition among individual products? The
first is a classic question related to anticompetitive effects of bundling (or tying). The
second is a question that some recent papers analyzed. In this paper, we revisit these ques-
tions in a framework in which consumers have heterogeneous switching costs. Although
both bundling and switching costs are topics intensively investigated in the IO literature,
to our knowledge there has been no paper that addresses the interaction between bundling
and switching costs.
A main motivation for us to study bundling in relation to switching costs comes from
convergence. Namely, convergence in information technology has made bundling a key
business strategy and policy makers are very interested in knowing how bundling practices
will affect competition and consumers’ surplus.
Examples of bundling practices originated from convergence or advancement in infor-
mation technology are abundant. Many telecommunications operators in the world offer
triple-play boxes that provide Internet access, TV access and telephone service in a pack-
age. Hand-set manufacturers such as Apple, Nokia, Samsung integrate more and more
diverse services and products into their handsets such as operating system, webbrowser,
emails, camera, interactive maps, GPS, MP3, on-line games, etc. In the case of cloud
computing, service providers offer a whole range of integrated services of data manage-
ment such that an employee of a client company can get access to software and database
necessary for her work just from the Internet.
This trend of bundling in IT sector raises two kinds of questions. First, we ask whether
bundling would destabilize the level-playing field for the competition between a big com-
pany offering a whole range of services and small companies specialized in each service in
favor of the former. In other words, does bundling build barriers to entry to producers
of specialized services? Second, is competition between bundled products fiercer than
competition that would arise when bundling is prohibited?
We address these questions in a context of switching costs. Switching costs can be very
high in the above examples. For instance, a mobile phone user writes down her contacts
into the phone, stocks songs, pictures, games and downloads applications. Actually, the
cost of switching only an email account from one to another can be extremely high if
the user intensively sends and receives files and all these files are stocked in the email
account. This suggests that the scale of switching cost will be far larger in the case of
cloud computing service offered to businesses. Although we described only examples in
the IT sector, our framework applies to other industries as long as switching costs are
significant.
To address the question whether bundling builds a barrier to entry, we study the pricing
game played between an incumbent producing n products (that can be independently
consumed) and n specialist entrants. There is a mass one of consumers who have a
unit demand for each of n products. Every product gives each consumer a surplus equal
to u, which is large enough such that every consumer consumes n products. However,
consuming a product offered by an entrant requires to bear a switching cost. We assume
that a consumer’s switching cost is given by a non-negative constant a ∈ [0, 1)1 plus a
random term which is uniformly distributed over [0, 1], and the random terms are i.i.d.
across products. Clearly, a can be interpreted as an index which represents consumers’
preferences for the incumbent’s products, but we show in Section 2 that a can also be
interpreted as a degree of homogeneity of consumers in terms of switching costs.
We compare the case in which bundling is prohibited from the case in which it is
allowed. The former is called ”independent pricing vs. independent pricing” and the
latter ”mixed bundling vs. independent pricing”. Note that mixed bundling includes pure
bundling and independent pricing as special cases. Since all products can be independently
consumed, in the case of ”independent pricing vs. independent pricing”, we can analyze
each market in isolation.
When we compare ”pure bundling vs. independent pricing” with ”independent pricing
vs. independent pricing”, we find that the incumbent’s profit is always higher in the former
than in the latter, implying that pure bundling is credible. When n = 2, each entrant’s
profit is smaller in the former than in the latter if and only if a < 0.54623. However, as n
increases, this threshold value of a increases such that in the limit as n tends to infinity,
each entrant’s profit is zero for any a ∈ [0, 1). Therefore, for small n bundling reduces the
profit of relatively strong entrants while (moderately) increasing the profit of relatively
weak entrants. Since an entrant’s profit always decreases in a, if there is a fixed cost of
entry which does not depend on a, weak entrants are unlikely to be able to enter anyway.
Hence, our results suggest that bundling effectively builds barrier to entry and is credible;
the barrier to entry is more important as the number of bundled products increases.
The intuition can be provided in terms of two effects: demand size effect and demand
elasticity effect. The incumbent’s bundling changes competition between individual prod-
ucts into competition between two bundles where the price of the bundle of the entrants
is the sum of each entrant’s price. Hence, under bundling, what matters is the distribu-
tion of the average switching cost, which is more skewed around the mean switching cost
than the distribution of the individual switching costs. This implies that even though the
incumbent maintains the same aggregate price, bundling increases its demand as long as
its market share is larger than a half in the absence of bundling. This is the ”demand
1The restriction a < 1 is imposed otherwise each entrant realizes zero profit in the benchmark in which
bundling is prohibited.
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size” effect which works always in favor of the incumbent. Furthermore, the incumbent
has an incentive to change its price after bundling. Bundling makes the demand for the
incumbent’s bundle more elastic when the marginal consumers have an average switching
cost close to the mean; then bundling induces the incumbent to reduce its price. On the
contrary, bundling makes the demand more rigid if the marginal consumers have an aver-
age switching cost close to the extreme values for switching costs; then bundling induces
the incumbent to increase its price. As a increases, the switching cost of the marginal
consumer becomes smaller and closer to the lowest possible value, a, and this induces an
increase in the price of the incumbent. Actually, we find that when n = 2, bundling makes
the incumbent more aggressive if and only if a < 0.12132. When the incumbent reduces
(increases) its price, the entrants respond by reducing (increasing) their prices since prices
are strategic complements. Overall, from the incumbent’s point of view, the demand size
effect dominates the demand elasticity effect when they work in opposite directions such
that bundling always increases the incumbent’s profit. Regarding the entrant’s profit, as
a increases, the competition softening effect from the change in demand elasticity domi-
nates the demand size effect such that bundling increases its profit for a > 0.54623 when
n = 2. As n increases, the distribution of average switching cost is more skewed toward
the mean, suggesting that the demand size effect becomes stronger. In particular, for a
large n consumers are almost homogeneous since the distribution of the average switching
cost is very concentrated near the mean. Then the incumbent can attract almost all con-
sumers by charging a price equal to the expected switching cost, but in fact the incumbent
does much better since each entrant charges a relatively high price, larger than u− a− 1
2
,
in order to profit form the small amount of consumers which are not attracted by I. This
allows I to charge the monopoly price u while attracting all consumers. It is remarkable
that a large coordination failure occurs among entrants, since if each entrant reduces his
price below u − a − 1
2
, then entrants would attract all consumers and make a significant
profit.
For the case of n = 2 we also consider mixed bundling of the incumbent, and we
find that the equilibrium outcome is the same as in the case of pure bundling. A mixed
bundling strategy turns out to be a best reply for the incumbent only when a is small and
the entrants play very small prices, but that never occurs in equilibrium. On the other
hand, when entrants’ prices are not small, mixed bundling is inferior to bundling for the
incumbent because it cannibalizes the incumbent’s revenue from the sales of the bundle,
and this revenue reduction is not compensated by the increase in revenue due to sales of
separate products.
We now turn to the second question: is head-to-head competition between bundles
fiercer than competition among individual products? To answer the question, we study
the competition between a generalist incumbent and a generalist entrant; each of them
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produces n different products. We compare ”independent pricing vs. independent pricing”
with ”bundle vs. bundle”; in the latter case, each firm offers only a pure bundle.
With respect to the comparison between ”independent pricing vs. independent pric-
ing” and ”bundling vs independent pricing”, the comparison between ”independent pric-
ing vs independent pricing” and ”bundle vs bundle” brings in one new effect, ”externality
internalization” effect; a generalist entrant internalizes the positive externalities on other
products from a reduction of the price of a given product and chooses lower prices than
n specialist entrants under ”bundling vs independent pricing”. Actually, because of this
effect both firms realize a lower profit under ”bundle vs bundle” than under ”bundling
vs independent pricing”. However, the demand size effect and the demand elasticity still
exist under ”bundle vs bundle”. Actually, when n = 2, for a > 0.68794, the compe-
tition softening effect from the change in demand elasticity dominates all other effects
and every firm’s profit is higher under ”bundle vs bundle” than under ”independent pric-
ing vs independent pricing”. Obviously, because of the positive demand size effect, the
threshold value of a that makes the incumbent’s profit higher under ”bundle vs bundle”
is smaller than 0.68794, and equal to 0.20743. Consistently with this fact, consumers’
surplus is lower under ”bundle vs bundle” for a > 0.37602, which is between the two
previous thresholds. For a large n we find again that I can attract almost all consumers
by playing a price per product slightly smaller than the average switching cost. However,
now the entrant’s price is close to zero, since there is no coordination failure within a
(single) generalist entrant, and the incumbent is unable to extract all consumers’ surplus.
Nevertheless, the incumbent’s profit is higher under ”bundle vs bundle” than under ”in-
dependent pricing vs independent pricing”, and the entrant’s profit is close to zero for any
a ∈ [0, 1). Finally, consumers’ surplus is lower under ”bundle vs bundle” for a > 0.19615.
We conclude by considering the case in which each consumer’s switching cost is per-
fectly correlated across different products. In this case, neither demand size effect nor
demand elasticity effect exists. Actually, we first find that the outcome of ”independent
pricing vs independent pricing” is equivalent to that of ”bundle vs bundle”. In the case of
”pure bundling vs independent pricing”, because of non-internalization of externalities, n
specialist entrants charge higher prices than a generalist entrant, which in turns induces
the incumbent to charge a higher price. For this reason, the incumbent’s profit is always
higher under ”pure bundling vs independent pricing” than under ”independent pricing
vs independent pricing”. In the case of the entrants, as n increases, the loss from mis-
coordination of prices dominates the competition softening effect of the miscoordination
such that the entrant’s profit is lower under ”pure bundling vs independent pricing” than
under ”independent pricing vs independent pricing” if and only if n > 4 for any a ∈ [0, 1).
The bundling (or tying) literature can be divided into three categories.2 The first one
2See Armstrong (2006) for a useful survey.
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includes the papers that view bundling as a screening device for a monopolist (Schmalensee,
1984, McAfee et al. 1989, Salinger 1995, Armstrong 1996, Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999,
Fang and Norman, 2006). The second category examines whether bundling builds a bar-
rier to entry. The third one is about competitive bundling (Nalebuff, 2000, Armstrong and
Vickers (2010) and Thanassoulis, forthcoming). Our paper is closely related to the second
and the third category. The second one can be divided into the papers that consider one
specialist entrant such as Whinston (1990) and Nalebuff (2004) and those that consider
multiple specialist entrants such as Nalebuff (2000) and Choi and Stefanadis (2001). Our
main contribution with respect to the literature on multiple specialist entrants is that
we provide general insight based on the two effects ”demand size effect” and ”demand
elasticity effect” by varying the parameter a that represents the degree of consumer homo-
geneity in terms of switching cost. Furthermore, we show that pure bundling is profitable
and credible (even if mixed bundling is allowed, the incumbent uses pure bundling).
Whinston (1990) studies leverage from tying a monopoly product to another product
that faces competition. Tying induces the incumbent to be aggressive and reduces the
profit of the rival firm in the market of the tied product; thus tying may induce that firm
not to enter in the presence of some fixed cost. Notice however that tying reduces the
profit of the incumbent if the rival enters, and in this sense it is not credible unless it
succeeds in driving the rival out of the market. Our paper is not about leverage since
the n products are symmetric, and we find that pure bundling is profitable and credible
and that pure bundling can make the incumbent more or less aggressive depending on
a. Nalebuff (2004) shows how bundling two products can reduce the profit of an entrant
in a single market, but his result applies under the assumption that the incumbent is
a Stackelberg leader in setting its prices. In our paper, instead, all prices are chosen
simultaneously by all players.
Nalebuff (2000) is the closest reference to our paper. The key difference is that Nalebuff
considers a symmetric Hotelling model. For instance, in the case of ”independent pricing
vs independent pricing”, the two firms competing in the market for a given product are
symmetric in a standard Hotelling model. Then, starting from the equilibrium prices for
this regime, the demand size effect is zero, and the demand elasticity makes the incumbent
more aggressive, which induces the entrants to be also more aggressive under ”bundling
vs independent pricing”. The result is that when n = 2 or n = 3, the incumbent’s profit
is smaller than under ”independent pricing vs independent pricing”.3
Choi and Stefanadis (2001) provide a theory of dynamic leverage by studying a set-
ting in which the incumbent sells two perfect complements and faces an entrant in each
component. Each entrant decides its R&D amount, which determines the probability of
3In addition, Nalebuff (2000) does not analyze the case in which the incumbent practices mixed
bundling.
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successfully developing a product superior to that of the incumbent. Without tying, each
entrant can make a profit whenever its R&D is successful, but if the incumbent ties the
two components, an entrant profits only if both entrants’ R&D are successful. Thus, tying
reduces the entrants’ incentives to invest in R&D and reduces the probability that the
incumbent is eliminated from the market by two successful entrants. However, this un-
certainty related to the success or failure of R&D is crucial in their theory: conditional on
that each entrant has a superior technology, entry occurs regardless of tying. This is the
main difference with respect to our paper in which bundling can deter entry even though
the fixed cost is such that each entrant can enter successfully if bundling is prohibited.
Nalebuff (2000) and Thanassoulis (forthcoming) study the regime of ”bundle vs bundle”,
and they find (as in our paper) that each firm realizes a lower profit than under ”bundling
vs independent pricing”.4 They also find that competition is fiercer under ”bundle vs
bundle” than under ”independent pricing vs independent pricing”. Similar results are
obtained by Matutes and Regibeau (1988, 1992)5 and by Armstrong and Vickers (2010).
When n = 2, we find that this negative effect of bundling on profits holds only for small a.
Furthermore, in the case of a large n the incumbent’s profit is always larger under ”bun-
dle vs bundle” than under ”independent pricing vs independent pricing”, as we explained
above.
2 Model
We consider two variations of one model to address two different questions. We first
consider competition between a generalist incumbent (producing n different products) and
n specialist entrants to address the question of whether bundling helps the incumbent to
build a barrier to entry. And then we consider competition between a generalist incumbent
and a generalist entrant to address the question of whether competition between bundles
is fiercer than competition among individual products.
4In Thanassoulis (forthcoming), there are small customers who buy only one of the two products and
large customers who buy both. Hence, pure bundling is never optimal with respect to mixed bundling.
However, he obtains that when two firms producing different products merge and use mixed bundling, the
rivals have no incentive to merge to use mixed bundling as competition becomes fiercer under "bundling
vs bundling".
5Matutes and Regibeau (1988, 1992) assume that firms choose between offering compatible or incom-
patible products before competing, and find that often profits are higher under compatibility. Products
are compatible by assumption in Nalebuff (2000), but compatibility is irrelevant under ”bundle vs bundle”.
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2.1 Competition with n specialist entrants
There is one generalist incumbent I who produces n(≥ 2) different products, and there
are n specialist entrants: Ei is the entrant for product i, for i = 1, ...n. Each consumer
has a unit demand for product i, and the utility that he obtains from each product i
is u > 0 regardless of whether it is produced by the incumbent or by an entrant, and
regardless of the other products he consumes; therefore, the products have independent
values.
We study static games of price competition between the incumbent and the entrants.
In the period preceding the game, a mass one of consumers is assumed to have bought the
n products from the incumbent. Therefore, in order to obtain a positive market share,
an entrant i needs to induce some consumers to switch from the incumbent to Ei. For
simplicity, we suppose that the production cost is zero for all firms: later on, when we
discuss the implications of our results on foreclosure, we introduce a fixed cost of entry
for the entrants.
We model switching costs by assuming that the consumers are uniformly distributed
over the unit hypercube [0, 1]n, and for a consumer with type (x1, ..., xn) [that is, located
at (x1, ..., xn)], the switching cost for product i is si = α + βxi with α ≥ 0 and β >
0. It turns out that equilibrium profits are homogenous of degree one in (α, β): if we
denote by πrj(α, β) the equilibrium profit of firm j under regime r (the regime could be
”independent pricing vs independent pricing”, for example), then πrj(α, β) = βπ
r
j(
α
β
, 1).6
Our main purpose is to investigate whether different competition regimes increase of
decrease the firms’ profits, and this investigation yields same results in the original model
with si = α + βxi as in a model with si = a + xi, in which a =
α
β
. Hence, in what at
follows we assume that a consumer with type (x1, ..., xn) has switching cost si = a + xi
for product i, with a ≥ 0. In addition, we assume a < 1 and u > 1 + a, which guarantee
respectively that the equilibrium prices are strictly positive when bundling is prohibited,
and that every consumer buys each product, except in the setting of Section 4.2.
A natural interpretation of an increase in a is that the asymmetry between the in-
cumbent and the entrants increases, but in fact an alternative interpretation is possible,
related to consumers heterogeneity. Precisely, given a µ > 0, consider the original for-
mulation with si = α + βxi in which α =
2µa
1+2a
and β = 2µ
1+2a
; notice that a = α
β
. Then
an increase in a causes an increase in α and a decrease in β, but the expected switching
cost, α + β
2
, is equal to µ for every a. Therefore, as a increases consumers become more
similar in terms of switching cost, but the average switching cost is unchanged. From the
equality πrj(α, β) =
2µ
1+2a
πrj(a, 1) we infer that by studying how a affects the comparison
6Precisely, equilibrium market shares are homogenous of degree zero in (α,β) and equilibrium prices
are homogenous of degree one in (α, β).
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between πrj(a, 1) and π
r′
j (a, 1) for different regimes r and r
′, we infer how a different degree
of consumers’ heterogeneity affects the firms’ preferences between r and r′.
We study two different games of simultaneous pricing played between the incumbent
and the entrants, in which each entrant i is assumed to choose a price pEi for his product
i in a non cooperative way. The two games differ depending on whether or not the
incumbent’s bundling is allowed. If it is prohibited, then we have
• Independent pricing versus independent pricing: the incumbent chooses pIi and
entrant i chooses pEi for each product i = 1, ..., n.
If the incumbent’s bundling is allowed, then we have
• Mixed bundling versus independent pricing (for the case of n = 2): The incumbent
can use mixed bundling and charge PI for the bundle and pI1, pI2 for each single
product; entrant i chooses pEi for i = 1, 2.
A special case of the above game is
• Pure bundling versus independent pricing: The incumbent is restricted to offer a
pure bundle and charges PI for the bundle; entrant i chooses pEi for i = 1, ..., n.
We call the game of ”independent pricing versus independent pricing” game II, ”mixed
bundling versus independent pricing” is game MI, and ”pure bundling versus independent
pricing” is game BI. In this section, we study the two games II and MI and compare their
outcomes in terms of the incumbent’s profit and each entrant’s profit. To denote equilib-
rium prices (and profits and consumers’ surplus) of each game, we use the superscripts
II, MI, BI.
2.2 Competition with a generalist entrant
We also consider competition between a generalist incumbent and a generalist entrant,
assuming that each of them produces the n products. We compare ”independent pricing
versus independent pricing” with ”bundle versus bundle” in terms of each firm’s profit
and consumers’ surplus.7 In the case of ”bundle versus bundle”, we assume that each firm
just sells a pure bundle of n products. We call the game of ”bundle versus bundle” game
BB and use the superscript BB to denote equilibrium prices (and profits and consumers’
surplus) of this game.
7In our model social surplus is nu minus the average switching cost which consumers incur, and is
maximized when each entrant has zero market share. Hence, we focus on the more interesting consumers’
surplus rather than on social welfare.
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Remark: Although we call one firm the incumbent and the other the entrant (denoted
by E), the latter does not need to be an entrant. Actually, our model of "bundle vs
bundle" can be interpreted as the last period of a dynamic duopoly competition in which
both firms sell pure bundles. Then, in the beginning of the last period, there are two
groups of consumers depending which bundle they bought in the previous period. Once
we allow the firms to charge different prices depending on which bundle a consumer bought
in the previous period, then we can isolate the competition in one group of consumers
from the competition in the other as in our model.
3 Independent pricing vs independent pricing
Suppose that bundling is prohibited. Given that the products have independent values,
each consumer can consume any combination of products regardless of who produced
them. This allows us to study the competition for each product in isolation, independently
of whether the incumbent faces n specialist entrants or a generalist entrant. Because of
the symmetry among the n products, in this section we do not use the notation i for
i = 1, ..., n.
Given (pI , pE), a consumer with switching cost x+a is indifferent between buying the
incumbent’s product and the entrant’s product if and only if8
pI = pE + x+ a, (1)
which is equivalent to
x = pI − pE − a.
Therefore, each firm’s profit is given by:
πI = (1 + a− (pI − pE))pI ;
πE = (pI − pE − a)pE.
It is straightforward to find the unique equilibrium prices, denoted by pIII , p
II
E .
Proposition 1 (independent pricing) Consider the game of ”independent pricing vs in-
dependent pricing”. Then, in each product market,
(i) The incumbent and the entrant charge the following prices:
pIII =
2
3
+
a
3
; pIIE =
1
3
− a
3
. (2)
8Clearly, for some values of pI , pE there exists no x ∈ [0, 1] which satisfies (1), but in the proof of
Proposition 1 in the appendix we prove that equilibrium prices are such that (1) has a solution in (0, 1).
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(ii) The incumbent’s and the entrant’s market share are equal to pIII and p
II
E respectively,
and therefore the profits are
πIII =
1
9
(2 + a)2; πIIE =
1
9
(1− a)2.
(iii) Consumer surplus is given by
CSII = u− 1
18
(8a+ 11− a2)
As it is intuitive, the price and the market share of the incumbent increase with a. As
a consequence, πIII also increases with a. On the other hand, the price, market share and
profit of the entrant decrease with a. We also compute the consumers’ surplus, which will
be used in the section which studies competition between two generalist firms.
4 Competition with n specialist entrants
4.1 Analysis of n = 2
In this subsection, we consider the case of two products. We study the game of "mixed
bundling versus independent pricing" and compare its outcome with that of "independent
pricing versus independent pricing" in terms of the incumbent’s profit and each entrant’s
profit.
4.1.1 Pure bundling
We first consider the case in which the incumbent is restricted to offer only a pure bundle.
Then, each consumer needs to choose between buying the bundle of the incumbent and
buying both products offered by E1 and E2. Therefore, we are essentially considering
competition between two bundles when the price of the bundle of the entrants is the sum
of the two prices chosen by the entrants in an uncoordinated fashion.
Given (PI , pE1, pE2), a consumer with switching costs (x1 + a, x2 + a) is indifferent
between buying the incumbent’s bundle and the entrants’ bundle if and only if
PI = pE1 + pE2 + 2a+ x1 + x2.
When 0 ≤ PI − pE1 − pE2 − 2a ≤ 1,9 the demand for the bundle of the entrants is
1
2
(PI − pE1 − pE2 − 2a)2.
9The proof of Proposition 2 establishes that these conditions are satisfied in equiilbrium.
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Therefore, in this case, the profit functions are given by:
ΠI =
[
1− 1
2
(PI − pE1 − pE2 − 2a)2
]
PI ; (3)
πE1 =
1
2
(PI − pE1 − pE2 − 2a)2pE1, πE2 = 1
2
(PI − pE1 − pE2 − 2a)2pE2. (4)
and it is immediate to find the equilibrium prices PBII , p
BI
E1, p
BI
E2.
Proposition 2 (n = 2: pure bundling) Consider competition between the incumbent’s
pure bundle and the entrants’ products when each entrant chooses the price for its product.
(i) The equilibrium prices are
PBII =
2
5
(3a+
√
10 + 4a2); pBIE1 = p
BI
B2 =
1
10
(
√
10 + 4a2 − 2a).
PBII is increasing in a whereas p
BB
Ei is decreasing in a.
(ii) The incumbent’s market share is increasing in a and belongs to [4
5
, 1) for any a ∈ [0, 1).
The profits are
ΠBII =
4
125
(
a2 + 10
)√
10 + 4a2 +
8
125
a
(
20− a2) ;
πBIE1 = π
BI
E2 =
1
250
(
8a2 + 5
)√
10 + 4a2 − 1
125
a
(
8a2 + 15
)
.
4.1.2 Mixed bundling
In this section we consider the case in which the incumbent practices mixed bundling, that
is he chooses a price PI for the bundle of his products, and pI1, pI2 for his single products.
Entrants E1 and E2 choose pE1, pE2. We find that the only equilibrium outcome is the
same which is obtained in the case of ”pure bundling vs independent pricing”.
First we notice that if PI > pI1 + pI2, then no type of consumer buys the bundle of
the incumbent, as buying I’s two separate products is less expensive. However, the profit
of I is unchanged if instead he lowers PI to satisfy PI = pI1 + pI2: if a consumer chooses
to buy both products of the incumbent, the latter receives the same amount of money
regardless of whether the consumer buys the products separately or as a bundle. Thus,
without loss of generality, we assume that PI ≤ pI1 + pI2.
As a consequence, each consumer chooses among the following four alternatives: II
(which means buying the incumbent’s bundle), IE (which means buying product 1 from
I and the product of E2), EI (which means buying product 2 from I and the product of
E1), EE (which means buying the product of E1 and the product of E2). Precisely, for
a consumer with type (x1, x2), that is with switching costs s1 = x1 + a and s2 = x2 + a,
the cost of alternative II is PI ; the cost of IE is pI1 + pE2 + x2 + a; the cost of EI is
11
pE1 + x1 + a + pI2; the cost of EE is pE1 + x1 + a + pE2 + x2 + a. We denote with SII
(respectively, with SIE, SEI , SEE) the set of types for which II (respectively, IE,EI, EE)
is the least expensive alternative.
We find that the four sets SII , SIE, SEI , SEE are all non-empty if and only if the
following conditions are satisfied
max{pI1 + pE2 + a, pI2 + pE1 + a} ≤ PI ≤ pI1 + pI2
1 + pE1 + a ≥ pI1 ≥ pE1 + a, 1 + pE2 + a ≥ pI2 ≥ pE2 + a
(5)
see figure 1 at the end of this document
and we letA(SII), A(SIE), A(SEI), A(SEE) denote the areas of the regions SII , SIE, SEI , SEE.
Hence, when (5) holds the profits of I and E1, E2 are given by
ΠI = PIA(SII) + pI1A(SIE) + pI2A(SEI)
πE1 = pE1[A(SEI) +A(SEE)], πE2 = pE2[A(SIE) +A(SEE)]
Obviously, mixed bundling provides greater flexibility for the incumbent with respect
to bundling. Nevertheless, and somewhat surprisingly, we find that in any equilibrium the
incumbent plays a pure bundling strategy and the same equilibrium outcome of Proposi-
tion 2 is obtained.10
Proposition 3 (n = 2: mixed bundling) Suppose that the incumbent can use mixed
bundling while facing two entrants. Then the equilibrium outcome coincides with the equi-
librium outcome of the game in which the incumbent is restricted to use pure bundling,
described by Proposition 2.
This result holds because it rarely occurs that a mixed bundling strategy is a best
reply for the incumbent, and in those rare cases no equilibrium exists. More in detail,
assume that entrants play the same price pE1 = pE2 = pE; then in the proof of Proposition
3 we find that the profit of the incumbent depends on pE and a only through their sum
pE + a, which we denote k. Given k, the best pure bundling strategy of the incumbent
turns out to be PI(k) =
4
3
k + 1
3
√
6 + 4k2 with pI1 ≥ PI(k) − k, pI2 ≥ PI(k) − k. These
values of pI1, pI2 imply that A(SEI) = A(SIE) = 0: each consumer either buys the bundle
of I (if x1+x2 > PI(k)−2k) or both products from the entrants (if x1+x2 ≤ PI(k)−2k).
Now we study the profitability for I of lowering pI1, pI2 such that pI1 = pI2 = pI
between 1
2
PI(k) and PI(k) − k,11 keeping PI = PI(k). This implies that A(SEI) >
10This result contrasts with the results in the literature which allows firms to use mixed bundling, but
in that literature firms are often on a symmetric footing.
11The condition pI ≥ 12PI(k) is equivalent to PI(k) ≤ pI1 + pI2.
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0, A(SIE) > 0, while A(SII) and A(SEE) are reduced because a few consumer select
alternative EI or IE, although they choose EE or II when pI ≥ PI(k)− k.
see figure 2 at the end of this document
Precisely, SIE is the south-east rectangle in the square of figure 2.
12 Region X represents
the set of consumers which buy the bundle of I when pI ≥ PI(k) − k, but when pI <
PI(k) − k they buy from I only product 1. On the other hand, region Y is the set of
consumers which buy the products of E1, E2 when pI ≥ PI(k)−k, but when pI < PI(k)−k
they buy product 1 from I. In order to evaluate the profitability of pI < PI(k)−k, notice
that mixed bundling generates a loss for I equal to PI(k)−pI from each consumer in region
X, while I gains pI from each consumer in region Y . Since the areas of regions X and Y
are 1
2
(2+3k−PI(k)−pI)(PI(k)−k−pI) and 12(PI(k)−k−pI)2 respectively, the net gain
for I is (pI−PI(k))12(2+3k−PI(k)−pI)(PI(k)−k−pI)+pI 12(PI(k)−k−pI)2. Standard
methods shows that, for k > 0.0486, this function is negative for each pI between
1
2
PI(k)
and PI(k)− k. Therefore the loss suffered on consumers in region X is not compensated
by the gain from consumers in region Y , which makes mixed bundling unprofitable for
I.13 In other terms, mixed bundling is inferior to bundling for the incumbent because
it generates an internal competition among the products of I which reduces I’s revenue
from the sale of the bundle more than it increases his revenue from the sale of separate
products.14
Finally, although mixed bundling is a best reply for I when k is small, no equilibrium
exists in this case. First, it is obviously impossible that k is small unless also a is small.
Second, for the case of a small a we find that no mixed bundling strategy of I induces the
entrants to play pE1, pE2 small.
4.1.3 Comparison
Before we compare the outcome of the game II with that of the game BI, we here
introduce the key effects that we later use to provide intuition about the comparison.
12Because of symmetry, the same arguments below apply to the consumers which now select alternative
EI, located in a north-west region of the square which is not depicted in figure 2.
13This analysis is only suggestive of why mixed bundling is not a best reply for I except for small values
of k, and not a sound proof, because it relies on fixing PI at PI(k). Conceivably, there could exists a
mixed bundling strategy which is a best reply for I and such that PI = PI(k). Lemma 2 in the Proof of
Proposition 3 provides a complete proof.
14Figure 2 suggests an insight on why small values of k favor mixed bundling. Smaller values of k move
to the right the −1 sloped line which separates the set of consumers which buy the bundle of I from the
consumers which buy the entrants’ products. This implies that for a given value of PI(k)−k− pI , which
determines the area of region Y , the area of region X is smaller, and thus is smaller the probability of
loss for the incumbent from playing pI < PI(k)− k. However, also the gain in region Y and the loss in
region X depend on k, and they are both increasing in k.
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For this purpose, consider the case in which bundling is prohibited and all prices are
exogenously given as follows: pI1 = pI2 = pI and pE1 = pE2 = pE. Then the demand for
the product of each entrant is σE ≡ pI − pE − a, and assume that σE ∈ (0, 1/2). Suppose
now that the incumbent bundles his two products and offers only a pure bundle at a price
PI .
First, assume that PI = 2pI . Then we find that bundling increases the demand for
the incumbent; we call this the ”demand size effect”. Precisely, bundling implies that a
consumer with type (x1, x2) buys the bundle of I if and only if x1+x2 ≤ PI − 2pE −2a =
2σE. As a consequence, bundling does not affect the choice of the consumers who bought
both products from the incumbent or both products from the entrants under independent
pricing. However, it affects the decision of the consumers who bought one product from
the incumbent and the other from an entrant. Because of symmetry, let us consider
the consumers who bought product 1 from the incumbent and product 2 from E2: the
measure of this set of consumers is (1− σE)σE. Among these consumers, after bundling,
only consumers of measure 1
2
σ2E buy the bundle from the entrants and the others, with
measure (1− σE)σE − 12σ2E buy the bundle from the incumbent. The latter term is larger
than the former since σE ∈ (0, 1/2).15
Second, given pE1 = pE2 = pE, bundling affects the demand elasticity and hence the
price charged by the incumbent; we call this the ”demand elasticity effect”. To explain
it, we consider how bundling changes the best response of the incumbent in terms of
unit price; notice that for any pE, this best response is always found in the interval
[pE + a, pE + a+ 1]. In the case of independent pricing, the incumbent’s best response is
given by (if a+ pE ≤ 1, as it occurs in equilibrium)
BRIII (pE) =
1
2
(1 + a+ pE).
In the case in which the incumbent practices pure bundling, let pI =
1
2
PI denote the
average price chosen by I. Then, the incumbent’s optimal pI is given by
BRBII (pE) =
2
3
(a+ pE) +
1
6
√
4(a+ pE)2 + 6
and we find
BRBII (pE) ≷ BR
II
I (pE) iff a+ pE ≷
√
2− 1.
In particular, if pE = p
II
E (a) then a+p
II
E (a) ≷
√
2−1 reduces to a ≷ 3/√2−2 = 0.12132.16
Therefore, if entrants play pIIE (a) then pure bundling makes the incumbent tougher (resp.
softer) for low a (resp. for high a).
15The opposite result obtains if σE >
1
2 , but whenever pI is chosen optimally by I, the inequality
σE <
1
2 holds (see next paragraph).
16Actually, the incumbent’s total price is the same (i.e. PBI
I
= 2pII
I
) when a = 0.121 32.
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The demand elasticity effect has to do with the fact that after bundling, what matters
is the average switching cost a + 1
2
(x1 + x2) and its distribution is more concentrated
around the mean, a + 1
2
, than the distribution of the individual switching costs for the
single products. Therefore, compared to independent pricing, the demand for the bundle
of I is more elastic for pI close to pE + a+
1
2
and it is less elastic for pI close to pE + a or
close to pE+a+1 (i.e., for pI far from pE+a+
1
2
), because there are more consumers with
average switching cost close to a+ 1
2
, and fewer with average switching cost close to a or
to a+ 1. Given pE = p
II
E (a), as a increases we see that pI = p
II
I (a) gets closer to pE + a,
since for a large a the market share of each entrant is close to zero (Proposition 1), that
is the marginal consumers who are indifferent between buying the incumbent’s bundle
and buying the entrants’ bundle have an average switching cost which is close to a, the
lowest possible value. This explains why bundling makes the incumbent less aggressive
for relatively high a.
Third, the same kind of demand elasticity effect may arise for the two entrants as well,
in the sense that the demand for their products is very elastic for pE1 = pE2 = pE close to
pI − a − 12 . However, since entrants choose their prices in an uncoordinated fashion, we
find that they behave exactly like under ”independent pricing vs independent pricing”.
Precisely, given a price per product equal to pI , in the case of independent pricing the
best response of each entrant is given by:
BRIIE (pI) =
pI − a
2
.
Under bundling, given PI = 2pI , we study the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game
played by the entrants. Then, each entrant’s symmetric best response turns out to be
BRBIE (pI) = BR
II
E (pI).
Therefore, there is no demand elasticity effect on the side of entrants.17
We now turn to the comparison. We have:
Proposition 4 (n=2: BI vs II) Suppose that the incumbent practices bundling against
two specialist entrants.
(i) Bundling increases the incumbent’s profit: ΠBII > 2π
II
I for all a ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) The incumbent’s bundling reduces each entrant’s profit if and only if a < 0.546 23.
The above proposition can be explained easily from the effects we introduced in the
beginning of this subsection. First, the incumbent’s profit increases from the demand size
17As a consequence, bundling does not affect the equilibrium prices when a = 0.121 32, that is the
incumbent’s total price is the same and each entrant charges the same price: PBI
I
= 2pII
I
and pBI
E1 =
pBI
E2 = p
II
E
.
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effect: the same effect reduces each entrant’s profit. For a < 0.121 32, bundling induces the
incumbent to be more aggressive, which further reduces each entrant’s profit. However, the
demand size effect dominates the demand elasticity effect such that bundling increases the
incumbent’s profit for a < 0.121 32. On the contrary, for a > 0.121 32, bundling induces
the incumbent to be less aggressive with respect to ”independent pricing vs independent
pricing”, which in turn makes the entrants charge higher prices (since prices are strategic
complements). This competition softening effect dominates the demand size effect for
a > 0.546 23 and makes even the entrants’ profits higher under bundling.
4.2 Analysis of the case with more than two products
In this section we extend our analysis for the game ”pure bundling vs independent pricing”
to the case in which n is an arbitrary number larger than two.
Given n random variables (x1, ..., xn) uniformly distributed over [0, 1]
n, let x¯n =
1
n
(x1+
...+ xn) denote the arithmetic mean of (x1, ..., xn). We use Fn to denote the c.d.f. of x¯n,
and for any t ∈ [0, 1] we find Fn(t) = nnn!
∑n−1
k=0(−1)k
(
n
k
)
max{t− k
n
, 0}n. Given a price PI
charged by the incumbent for the bundle of his products, let p¯I ≡ 1nPI denote the average
price for each product in the bundle; likewise, let p¯E ≡ 1n
∑n
i=1 pEi denote the average
price charged by entrants. Then a consumer with type (x1, ..., xn) buys the incumbent’s
bundle if and only if PI ≤
∑n
i=1(pEi + xi + a), which is equivalent to p¯I ≤ p¯E + x¯ + a.
Thus the profit functions are given by
ΠI = np¯I [1− Fn(p¯I − p¯E − a)];
πEi = pEiFn(p¯I − p¯E − a)] for i = 1, ..., n
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium prices.
Proposition 5 (finite n ≥ 3: BI) Consider competition between the bundle of the in-
cumbent and the entrants’ products given n ≥ 3 number of products. Let δˆn be the unique
solution to
(n+ 1)Fn(δ) + (δ + a)F
′
n(δ) = 1 (6)
We find that δˆn ∈ (0, 12), and if 1−Fn(δˆn)F ′n(δˆn) ≤ u then the equilibrium prices are such that
pBIE1 = ... = p
BI
En = p
BI
E and p¯
BI
I −pBIE −a = δˆn. Precisely, p¯BII = 1−Fn(δˆn)F ′n(δˆn) and p
BI
E = n
Fn(δˆn)
F ′n(δˆn)
.
When n > 2, we find that the demand size effect is larger than when n = 2 (in fact,
this effect is increasing in n), which increases the profit of I. In addition, for a large n
the average switching cost is extremely concentrated near a+ 1
2
, which in turn makes the
demand for the bundle of I extremely concentrated around p¯I equal to p¯E + a+
1
2
. This
induces I to play p¯I slightly smaller than p¯E+a+
1
2
, as in this way he captures almost the
16
complete market share, while p¯I larger than p¯E +a+
1
2
yields it nearly zero market share.
If the entrants could coordinate their price choices, the equilibrium value of p¯E would be
close to zero; otherwise entrants could deviate and earn a large market share by slightly
undercutting I. However, n uncoordinated entrants are unable to do this, and in fact we
find a large coordination failure such that each entrant plays a price larger than u−a− 1
2
;
this allows I to attract almost all consumers by playing the monopoly price u, regardless
of the value of a.18 This result holds for any value of a, and thus no competition softening
effect applies when a increases. The consequence is that bundling is a very strong barrier
to entry when n is large.
Proposition 6 (limit: II vs BI) Consider competition between the bundle of the incum-
bent and the entrants’ products when the number of products tends to infinity.
(i) The incumbent’s price and profit per product converge to u; each entrant’s price
converges to a value large than u − a − 1
2
, thus his marked share and profit converge to
zero; consumers’ surplus per product converges to 0.
(ii) compared to ”independent pricing vs independent pricing”, the incumbent’s profit
is higher under bundling, each entrant’s profit and consumers’ surplus are lower under
bundling.
Remark 1 The result of Proposition 6 holds as long as (x1, ..., xn) are i.i.d. (and not
necessarily uniformly distributed) on [0, 1]n, with expected value µ, and then u− a− 1
2
in
Proposition 6(i) is replaced by u− a− µ.
5 Competition with a generalist entrant
In this section, we consider competition between a generalist incumbent and a generalist
entrant.
5.1 The case of two products
Consider the case of n = 2. We study the pricing game in which both the incumbent and
the entrant practice pure bundling.
Given (PI , PE), a consumer of type (x1, x2) is indifferent between buying the incum-
bent’s bundle and the entrant’s bundle if and only if
P I = PE + 2a+ x1 + x2.
18Notice that the prices obtained in Proposition 5 are not the equilibrium prices when n is large.
Precisely, Proposition 5 implicitly assumes that u is sufficiently large that all consumers buy all products,
but when n → +∞ we find that 1−Fn(δˆn)
F ′
n
(δˆn)
→ +∞ and nFn(δˆn)
F ′
n
(δˆn)
→ +∞. Thus the implicit assumption is
violated and Proposition 6 describes the result for the case of a large n.
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When 0 ≤ PI − PE − 2a ≤ 1,19 the demand for the bundle of the entrants is given by
1
2
(PI − PE − 2a)2.
In this case, we have the following profit functions:
ΠI =
[
1− 1
2
(PI − PE − 2a)2
]
PI ;
ΠE =
1
2
(PI − PE − 2a)2PE.
It is immediate to find the unique equilibrium prices PBBI , P
BB
E .
Proposition 7 (n = 2: bundle vs bundle) Consider competition between the two bundles
offered by the incumbent and a generalist entrant.
(i) The incumbent and the entrant charge the following prices:
PBBI =
1
4
(3
√
a2 + 2 + 5a); PBBE =
1
4
(
√
a2 + 2− a).
PBBI is increasing in a whereas P
BB
E is decreasing in a.
(ii) The incumbent’s market share is increasing in a and belongs to [3
4
, 1) for any a ∈ [0, 1).
The profits are
ΠBBI =
1
16
(9 + 2a2)
√
a2 + 2 +
1
16
(21− 2a2)a;
ΠBBE =
1
32
(
√
a2 + 2− a)3
(iii) Consumers’ surplus is given by
CSBB = 2u− 1
24
(
33a+ 2a3 + (17− 2a2)
√
a2 + 2
)
Before we compare ”bundle vs bundle” with ”independent pricing vs independent
pricing”, we perform the easier comparison between ”bundle vs independent pricing” and
”bundle vs bundle”. Then, we have:
Proposition 8 (n = 2: BI vs BB) When we compare ”bundling vs independent pricing”
with ”bundle vs bundle” we find
(i) the entrants’ bundling reduces the incumbent’s profit: ΠBII > Π
BB
I for all a ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) the entrants’ bundling reduces each entrant’s profit: 2πBIE > Π
BB
E for all a ∈ [0, 1].
19The proof of Proposition 7 establishes that these conditions are satisfied in equiilbrium.
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The above proposition is easy to understand. First, each specialist entrant does not
internalize the positive externality that it provides to the other entrant when it reduces
its price. Therefore, given the price of the incumbent, the specialist entrants charge
higher prices than a generalist entrant. This in turn induces the incumbent to charge a
higher price for its bundle under ”bundling vs independent pricing” than under ”bundle
vs bundle”. Therefore, all prices are higher under ”bundling vs independent pricing” than
under ”bundle vs bundle”.
We now turn to our main comparison. Is competition fiercer with "bundle vs bundle"
than with "independent pricing vs independent pricing"? We have:
Proposition 9 (n = 2: II vs BB) When we compare ”independent pricing vs independent
pricing” with ”bundle vs bundle”,
(i) The incumbent’s profit is higher under ”bundle vs bundle” if and only if a >
0.207 43: ΠBBI > 2π
II
I for a > 0.207 43.
(ii) Each entrant’s profit is higher under ”bundle vs bundle” if and only if a > 0.687 94.
(iii) Consumers’ surplus is higher under ”bundle vs bundle” if and only if a < 0.376 02.
Basically, with respect to the comparison between ”independent pricing vs indepen-
dent pricing” and ”bundling vs independent pricing”, there is only one new effect that is
generated by the comparison between ”independent pricing vs independent pricing” and
”bundle vs bundle”. This is the ”externality internalization” effect: a generalist entrant
is more aggressive than two specialist entrants because the former internalizes positive
demand externalities. In other words, the combination of the ”externality internalization”
effect with the ”demand size” and the ”demand elasticity” effects from the previous com-
parison determine the comparison between ”independent pricing vs independent pricing”
and ”bundle vs bundle.
First, the demand size effect means that bundling increases the incumbent’s profit
while decreasing the entrants’ profits. Second, the demand elasticity effect suggests that
for relatively low a, the incumbent becomes more aggressive under bundling. These effects
together with the ”externality internalization effect” makes the entrant’s profit smaller
under bundling for a small. Actually, the latter two effects make even the incumbent’s
profit smaller under bundling for a < 0.207 43. However, as a increases, the competition
softening effect dominates all other effects such that every firm’ profit is higher under
bundling for a > 0.687 94. Since the incumbent benefits for the demand size effect, the
incumbent’s profit is higher under bundling for a > 0.207 43. Finally, consumers’ surplus
is lower under bundling for a > 0.376 02. Therefore, our analysis provides quite a nuanced
picture about the conventional wisdom that competition between bundles is fiercer than
competition among individual products.
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5.2 The case of more than two products
In this section we extend our analysis for the game ”bundle vs bundle” to the case in
which n is an arbitrary number larger than two.
As in Section 4.2, a consumer with type (x1, ..., xn) buys the incumbent’s bundle if
and only if PI ≤ PE +
∑n
i=1(xi + a), which is equivalent to p¯I ≤ p¯E + x¯n + a, in which
p¯I ≡ 1nPI , p¯E ≡ 1nPE and x¯n is the arithmetic mean of (x1, ..., xn), with c.d.f. Fn. Thus
ΠI = np¯I [1− Fn(p¯I − p¯E − a)], ΠE = p¯EFn(p¯I − p¯E − a).
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium prices.
Proposition 10 (finite n ≥ 3: BB) Consider competition between the bundle of the
incumbent and bundle of the generalist entrant given n ≥ 3 number of products. Let δˆn be
the unique solution to
2Fn(δ) + (δ + a)F
′
n(δ) = 1 (7)
Then 0 < δˆn <
1
2
and the equilibrium prices are such that p¯BBI − p¯BBE − a = δˆn. Precisely,
p¯BBI = δˆn +
Fn(δˆn)
F ′n(δˆn)
+ a and p¯BBE =
Fn(δˆn)
F ′n(δˆn)
.
When n is large, a few arguments mentioned in Section 4.2 apply to this setting: the
demand size effect is large and the average switching cost is very concentrated around
a+ 1
2
, so that I can win over almost all consumers with p¯I slightly smaller than p¯E+a+
1
2
.
However, now we find that the equilibrium value of p¯E must be close to zero, otherwise
the entrant could profitably undercut the incumbent; this leads to Proposition 11.
Proposition 11 Consider the competition between the bundle of the incumbent and the
bundle of the generalist entrant when the number products tends to infinity. Then
(i) The entrant’s market share tends to zero (and thus also his profit), the incumbent
price and profit per product tends to 1
2
+ a, and consumers’ surplus per product tends to
u− (1
2
+ a).
(ii) Compared to ”independent pricing vs independent pricing”
(a) The incumbent’s profit is always higher under ”bundle vs bundle” while any en-
trant’s profit is always lower under ”bundle vs bundle”.
(b) Consumer surplus is lower under ”bundle vs bundle” if and only if a > 0.196 15.
This proposition implies that for a large n, bundling is a strong barrier to entry for
a generalist entrant as it is for specialist entrants. Since this result holds for any a,
also in this setting there is no competition softening effect from the change in demand
elasticity. Moreover, since the demand size effect is large when n is large, the incumbent’s
profit is always larger under ”bundle vs bundle” than when bundling is banned. For this
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reason, the consumers’ surplus is likely to be smaller under ”bundle vs bundle. Actually,
consumers’ surplus is smaller under ”bundle vs bundle” for a > 0.196 15 while when n = 2,
consumers’ surplus is smaller under ”bundle vs bundle” for a > 0.376 02.
Remark 2 The result of Proposition 11 [except part (iib)] holds as long as (x1, ..., xn)
are i.i.d. (and not necessarily uniformly distributed) on [0, 1]n, with expected value µ, and
then 1
2
+ a in Proposition 11(i) is replaced by µ+ a.
6 The case of perfect correlation
In the previous sections, we assumed that the switching costs of a consumer are inde-
pendently distributed across different products. We now consider the case in which the
switching costs are perfectly correlated across different products: each consumer is char-
acterized by a unique x ∈ [0, 1] and his switching cost for each product is a+ x.
Obviously, perfect correlation does not affect the outcome under ”independent pricing
vs. independent pricing”. Furthermore, it is immediate to see that ”independent pricing
vs. independent pricing” is equivalent to ”bundle vs bundle”. To show this, let pI and
pE denote the average prices of the incumbent of the entrant: pI =
1
n
PI and pE =
1
n
PE.
Then, the type x of the consumer who is indifferent between the two bundles is given by
npI = npE + n(a+ x)
and therefore the demand of each bundle is the same as the demand of each individual
product under ”independent pricing vs. independent pricing”. The firms’ profits are
ΠI = n(1− (pI − pE − a))pI ,
ΠE = n(pI − pE − a)pE,
which are just the profits under ”independent pricing vs. independent pricing” times n.
We now consider ”pure bundling vs. independent pricing”. Given pI =
1
n
PI and
pE1, ..., pEn, the type x of the consumer who is indifferent between the two bundles is
given by
npI =
n∑
i=1
pEi + n(a+ x).
The firm’s profits are
ΠI = n(1 + a− (pI − 1
n
n∑
i=1
pEi))pI ,
πEi = (pI − 1
n
n∑
i=1
pEi − a)pEi. for i = 1, ..., n
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The equilibrium prices are given by
PBICI = n
1 + n+ a
n+ 2
, pBICE1 = ... = p
BIC
En =
n
n+ 2
(1− a),
where BIC refers to ”pure bundling vs. independent pricing” under perfect correlation.
The equilibrium profits are given by:
ΠBICI = n(
1 + n+ a
n+ 2
)2, πBICE1 = ... = π
BIC
En = n(
1− a
n+ 2
)2.
As a consequence, we find
Proposition 12 Suppose that each consumer’s switching costs are perfectly correlated
across different products.
(i) The outcome of ”independent pricing vs. independent pricing” is equivalent to that
of ”bundle vs bundle”.
(ii) If we compare the outcome of ”independent pricing vs. independent pricing” with
that of ”pure bundling vs independent pricing”, we have:
(a) The incumbent’s profit is always higher under ”pure bundling vs independent pric-
ing” than under ”independent pricing vs. independent pricing”: ΠBICI > nπ
II
I for any
n ≥ 2 and a ∈ [0, 1) .
(b) Each entrant’s profit is smaller under ”pure bundling vs independent pricing” than
under ”independent pricing vs. independent pricing” if and only if n > 4 regardless of a:
πBICE  πIIE for n ⋚ 4, for any a ∈ [0, 1) .
In the case of perfect correlation, neither demand size effect nor demand elasticity
effect exists. The only effect that remains is no internalization externality that arises
under ”pure bundling vs independent pricing”. Therefore, the specialist entrants charge
higher prices than they would if they acted cooperatively, which in turn induces the
incumbent to respond by charging a higher price. For this reason, the incumbent’s profit
is always higher under ”pure bundling vs independent pricing” than under ”independent
pricing vs. independent pricing”. In the case of entrants, this competition softening effect
from no internalization of externality is dominated by the effect of price miscoordination
for n > 4 such that their profit is lower under ”pure bundling vs independent pricing”
than under ”independent pricing vs. independent pricing”.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(i-ii) Given pE, we show that the incumbent plays pI between pE + a and pE + a+ 1.
If I plays pI ≤ pE + a, then he captures all the consumers and earns pI ; among these
values of pI, the best alternative for I is pI = pE + a. If instead pI > pE + a + 1, then I
makes no sale and his profit is zero, but pI = pE+a (for instance) is a profitable deviation
for him. For pI ∈ [pE + a, pE + a + 1], the profit of I is πI = (1 + a + pE − pI)pI and
is maximized with respect to pI at pI =
1
2
(1 + a + pE) if
1
2
(1 + a + pE) > pE + a, at
pI = a + pE if
1
2
(1 + a + pE) > pE + a. However, it is impossible that pI = a + pE and
pE > 0 in equilibrium, as then E makes no profit and has an incentive to reduce slightly
his price.
A similar argument applies to the entrant: given pI , E plays pE between pI − a− 1 and
pI − a and thus πE = (pI − a − pE)pE. The profit of E is maximized at pE = 12(pI − a)
and this equation, jointly with pI =
1
2
(1 + a+ pE) yields the equilibrium prices p
II
I , p
II
E in
(2). The market shares for I and E are (1 + a+ pIIE − pIII ) = pIII and pIII − a− pIIE = pIIE ,
respectively, thus the equilibrium profits for I and E are (pIII )
2 and (pIIE )
2 respectively.
(iii) The average cost borne by consumers is
∫ pIII −pIIE −a
0
(x+ a)dx+ πIII + π
II
E , which is
equal to 11
18
+ 4
9
a− 1
18
a2.
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Given pE1, pE2, we prove that the incumbent plays PI between pE1 + pE2 + 2a and
pE1 + pE2 + 2a+ 1. If PI < pE1 + pE2 + 2a, then I captures all the consumers and earns
PI ; among these values of PI , the best alternative for I is PI = pE1 + pE2 + 2a. If instead
PI is between pE1 + pE2 + 2a+ 1 and pE1 + pE2 + 2a+ 2,
20 then ΠI =
1
2
[2− (PI − pE1 −
pE2 − 2a)]2PI and dΠIdPI = 12(2 + 2a + pE1 + pE2 − PI)(2a + 2 + pE1 + pE2 − 3PI) < 0;
thus it is profitable for I to reduce PI to pE1 + pE2 + 2a + 1. For PI in the interval
20Playing PI larger than pE1 + pE2 + 2a+ 2 is unprofitable for I since then he makes no sale.
24
[pE1 + pE2 + 2a, pE1 + pE2 + 2a + 1], the profit of I is given by (3) and is maximized at
PI =
2
3
(pE1 + pE2 + 2a) +
1
3
√
6 + (pE1 + pE2 + 2a)2.
21
Since we have just proved that the equilibrium prices satisfy pE1 + pE2 + 2a < PI <
pE1 + pE2 +2a+1, the profit functions for the entrants are given in (4) for prices close to
the equilibrium prices. Therefore the first order conditions for maximization of πE1 (πE2)
with respect to pE1 (with respect to pE2) must be satisfied: PI − 3pE1− pE2− 2a = 0 and
PI − pE1 − 3pE2 − 2a = 0. Combining these conditions with PI = 23(pE1 + pE2 + 2a) +
1
3
√
6 + (pE1 + pE2 + 2a)2 we obtain P
BI
I , p
BI
E1, p
BI
E2.
Finally, we verify that pBIE1 is a best reply for E1 given P
BI
I , p
BI
E2.
22 The demand for the
bundle of the entrants is 0 if pE1 ≥ PBII − pBIE2 − 2a = 310
√
10 + 4a2 − 3
5
a; the demand is
1
2
( 3
10
√
10 + 4a2− 3
5
a−pE1)2 if pE1 ≤ 310
√
10 + 4a2− 3
5
a. ThusE1’s profit is 1
2
( 3
10
√
10 + 4a2−
3
5
a− pE1)2pE1 for pE1 ∈ [0, 310
√
10 + 4a2 − 3
5
a] and is maximized at pE1 = p
BI
E1.
(ii) Given PBII , p
BI
E1, p
BI
E2, the market share for I is 1 − 12(PBII − pBIE1 − pBIE2 − 2a)2 =
4
5
+ 2
25
a
√
10 + 4a2− 4
25
a2; this expression has value 4
5
at a = 0 and is it simple to see that
it is increasing in a. Given market shares, profits are straightforward to obtain.
The average cost borne by consumers is
∫ PBBI −pBIE1−pBIE2−2a
0
∫ PBBI −pBIE1−pBIE2−2a−x1
0
(2a + x1 +
x2)dx2dx1 +Π
BB
I +Π
BB
E , which is equal to
16
375
a (30 + a2)+ 1
375
(145− 8a2)√10 + 4a2 and
is larger than 2(11
18
+ 4
9
a − 1
18
a2), consumers’ average cost in case of independent pricing
vs independent pricing.
Proof of Proposition 3
We start by describing the conditions which determine the preferred alternative of
each consumer
• Type (x1, x2) of consumer buys II if and only if x1 ≥ PI − pI2 − pE1 − a, x2 ≥
PI − pI1 − pE2 − a, x1 + x2 ≥ p − pE1 − pE2 − 2a. Let SII denote the set of types
for which these conditions are satisfied.
• Type (x1, x2) of consumer buys IE if and only if x1 ≥ pI1−pE1−a, x2 ≤ PI−pI1−
pE2 − a, x2 − x1 ≤ pE1 + pI2 − pE2 − pI1. Let SIE denote the set of types for which
these conditions are satisfied.
• Type (x1, x2) of consumer buys EI if and only if x1 ≤ PI − pI2 − pE1 − a, x2 ≥
pI2 − pE2 − a, x1 − x2 ≤ pI1 + pE2 − pI2 − pE1. Let SEI denote the set of types for
which these conditions are satisfied.
21We are maximizing P− 12(P−c)2P with respect to P ∈ [c, c+1] and the derivative is −32P 2+2cP+1−
1
2c
2. This is positive in [c, 23c+
1
3
√
c2 + 6) and negative in ( 23c+
1
3
√
c2 + 6, c+1], thus P = 23c+
1
3
√
c2 + 6
is the maximum point.
22Essentially the same argument applies to E2. Regarding I, we have proved above that PBI
I
is a best
reply for I given pBI
E1, p
BI
E2.
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• Type (x1, x2) of consumer buysEE if and only if x1 ≤ pI1−pE1−a, x2 ≤ pI2−pE2−a,
x1 + x2 ≤ PI − pE1 − pE2 − 2a. Let SEE denote the set of types for which these
conditions are satisfied
For ease of notation, in this proof we use p, p1, p2 instead of PI , pI1, pI2, and q1, q2
instead of pE1, pE2.
We start with the study of the best reply of I. First we notice that given q1, q2 played
by E1 and E2, without loss of generality we can restrict attention to (p, p1, p2) such that{
max{p1 + q2 + a, p2 + q1 + a} ≤ p ≤ p1 + p2
q1 + a ≤ p1 ≤ 1 + q1 + a, q2 + a ≤ p2 ≤ 1 + q2 + a
(8)
We have justified in Section 8.1 the inequality p1 + p2 ≥ p, but we notice here that if
p = p1 + p2 then I is playing an independent pricing strategy since consumers get no
discount from buying BI rather than 1I2I . Regarding p ≥ max{p1 + q2 + a, p2 + q1 + a},
notice that if p < p1 + q2 + a then no type of consumer buys 1I2E since he prefers BI
for any switching costs (s1, s2). But I can achieve this outcome by reducing p1 such that
p = p1+ q2+ a;
23 thus without loss of generality we can assume that p ≥ p1+ q2+ a. The
same argument applies to justify p ≥ p2 + q1 + a.
About p1 ≤ 1 + q1 + a, we observe that if p1 > 1 + q1 + a then no type of consumer
buys 1I since 1E is less expensive for any (s1, s2) and I can achieve the same outcome by
reducing p1 such that p1 = 1+q1+a, and thus we can assume that p1 ≤ 1+q+a. Likewise,
if p2 > 1 + q2 + a then I can equivalently set p2 = 1 + q2 + a. Regarding p1 ≥ q1 + a,
notice that if p1 < q1 + a then each type of consumer prefers 1I to 1E, but that can also
be achieved with p1 = q1 + a. A consequence of (8) is
2 + q1 + q2 + 2a ≥ p ≥ q1 + q2 + 2a
Under conditions (8), each region SII , SIE, SEI , SEE is non-empty (although its mea-
sure could be zero). Precisely, we find
A(SII) = (1− p + p2 + q1 + a)(1− p2 + q2 + a) + 1
2
(2 + 2q1 + 2a− p+ p2 − p1)(p1 + p2 − p);
A(SIE) = (p− p1 − q2 − a)(1− p1 + q1 + a); A(SEI) = (p− p2 − q1 − a)(1− p2 + q2 + a);
A(SEE) = (p1 − q1 − a)(p− p1 − q2 − a) + 1
2
(p1 + p− p2 − 2q1 − 2a)(p1 + p2 − p)
and therefore,
πI = pA(SII) + p1A(SIE) + p2A(SEI)
23In this case there are a few types of consumers which are indifferent between BI and 1I2E, but this
set of consumers has zero measure.
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= (1 + q1 + a)(1 + q2 + a)p− (q2 + a)(1 + q1 + a)p1 − (1 + q2 + a)(q1 + a)p2
−(2 + 2a+ q1 + q2)p2 − (1 + q1 − q2)p21 − (1 + q2 − q1)p22
+2(1 + q1 + a)pp1 + 2(1 + q2 + a)pp2 +
1
2
p3 + p31 + p
3
2 −
3
2
pp21 −
3
2
pp22
An important property of πI is that if E1 and E2 play the same price q, then the
incumbent has no incentive to play p1 = p2. Precisely, if we set q1 = q2 = q in πI we
obtain
πI = (1 + q + a)
2p− (q + a)(1 + q + a)p1 − (1 + q + a)(q + a)p2 − 2(1 + q + a)p2 − p21
−p22 + 2(1 + q + a)pp1 + 2(1 + q + a)pp2 +
1
2
p3 + p31 + p
3
2 −
3
2
pp21 −
3
2
pp22
and thus πI can be written as f(p1, p)+ f(p2, p), with f(p1, p) =
1
2
(1+ q+ a)2p− (1+ q+
a)p2 + 1
4
p3 − (q + a)(1 + q+ a)p1 − p21 + 2(1 + q + a)pp1 + p31− 32pp21, which implies that I
can maximize πI by setting p1 = p2. Therefore we study the problem of maximizing
πI = (1+q+a)
2p−2(q+a)(1+q+a)p1−2(1+q+a)p2−2p21+4(1+q+a)pp1+
1
2
p3+2p31−3pp21
One useful property of this function is that it depends on q, a only through their sum
q + a, which we denote k in the following. Thus we obtain
πI = (1 + k)
2p− 2k(1 + k)p1 − 2(1 + k)p2 − 2p21 + 4(1 + k)pp1 +
1
2
p3 + 2p31 − 3pp21 (9)
and in view of (8) we maximize πI with respect to (p1, p) in the set A = {(p1, p) : p1+k ≤
p ≤ 2p1 and k ≤ p1 ≤ 1 + k}
see figure 3 at the end of this document
As we have claimed above, we can think that I plays independent pricing if p = 2p1
(a point in the north-west border of A), and then πI = 2(1 + k − p1)p1; I plays pure
bundling if p ∈ (2k, 1 + 2k) and p − k = p1 (the south-east border of A), and then
πI = [1 − 12(p − 2k)2]p, or if p ∈ [1 + 2k, 2 + 2k] and p1 = 1 + k (the east border of A),
and then πI =
1
2
(2k + 2 − p)2p; I plays mixed bundling if (p1, p) is in the interior of A,
and then πI is given in (9).
Lemma 1 Independent pricing is never a best reply for I.
Proof Given k we can view the pricing problem of I as the problem of a monopolist which
offers two goods and faces consumers with additive valuations for the two goods which are
uniformly distributed over [k, k + 1]2. Then Corollary 1 in McAfee et al. (1989) implies
that independent pricing is never a best reply for I.
Lemma 2 If k is such that I’s best reply is mixed bundling, then k ≤ 0.0652 and the
optimal (p1, p) is such that p1 >
2
3
, 1 + 2k > p > p1 + k.
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Proof In order for a mixed bundling strategy to be a best reply for I it is necessary that
∂πI
∂p
and ∂πI
∂p1
both vanish at a point in the interior of A. Precisely, we have
∂πI
∂p
= (1 + k)2 − 4(1 + k)p+ 4(1 + k)p1 + 3
2
p2 − 3p21
∂πI
∂p1
= −2k(1 + k) + 4(1 + k)p− 4p1 + 6p21 − 6pp1
and we prove that ∂πI
∂p
and ∂πI
∂p1
may both vanish at a point in the interior of A only if
k < 0.0652.
Step 1 ∂πI
∂p
< 0 for any (p1, p) in the interior of A such that p ≥ 1 + 2k.
If (p1, p) is in the interior of A and p ≥ 1 + 2k, then p1 ∈ (12 + k, 1 + k) and notice that
∂πI
∂p
is a convex function of p; thus it is maximized with respect to p ∈ [1 + 2k, 2p1] at
p = 1 + 2k or at p = 2p1. At p = 1 + 2k we find
∂πI
∂p
= −3p21 + 4(1 + k)p1 − 32 − 4k − k2;
this expression is maximized with respect to p1 at p1 =
{
2
3
+ 2
3
k if k ≤ 1
2
1
2
+ k if k > 1
2
, and the
resulting value of ∂πI
∂p
is
{
−1
6
− 4
3
k + 1
3
k2 < 0 if k ≤ 1
2
−1
4
− k < 0 if k > 1
2
which is negative in any case.
At p = 2p1 we find
∂πI
∂p
= (1− p1 + k)(k + 1− 3p1) < 0. Therefore ∂πI∂p < 0 for any (p1, p)
in the interior of A such that p ≥ 1 + 2k.
Step 2 If there exists (p1, p) in the interior of A such that p < 1+2k and
∂πI
∂p1
= ∂πI
∂p
= 0,
then k ≤ 0.0652.
If (p1, p) is in the interior of A and p < 1 + 2k, then p1 ∈ (k, 1 + k) and p > p1 + k.
From ∂π
I
∂p1
= 0 we get p =
k+k2+2p1−3p21
2+2k−3p1 and notice that if p1 ∈ (k, 23 + 23k),24 then p1 + k −
k+k2+2p1−3p21
2+2k−3p1 = k
1+k−p1
2+2k−3p1 > 0. Thus p1 + k >
k+k2+2p1−3p21
2+2k−3p1 and
∂πI
∂p1
does not vanish in the
interior of A for p1 <
2
3
(1 + k).
If p1 =
2
3
+ 2
3
k,25 then ∂πI
∂p1
= 2
3
k(1 + k) > 0.
In case that p1 >
2
3
(1 + k), we notice that p =
3p21−2p1−k−k2
3p1−2−2k < 1 + 2k is equivalent to
p1 >
2
3
+ k. We insert p =
3p21−2p1−k−k2
3p1−2−2k into
∂πI
∂p
= 0 to find that it is equivalent to
gk(p1) = 0 with
gk(p1) ≡ −27p41+36 (2k + 1) p31+6(1−12k2−13k)p21+4(8k3+13k2−k−6)p1+8−10k3+3k2+16k−5k4
We show that the equation gk(p1) = 0 has no solution in (
2
3
+ k, 1 + k) if k > 0.0652.
Notice that (i) gk(
2
3
+ k) = −1
3
k2(8k + 1) < 0; (ii) g′k(p1) = −108p31 + 108 (2k + 1) p21 +
12 (1− 12k2 − 13k) p1+4 (−6 + 13k2 − k + 8k3); (iii) g′′k(p1) = −324p21+216 (2k + 1) p1+
12 (1− 12k2 − 13k); (iv) for p1 ∈ [23 + k, 1 + k], the maximum point for g′′k is p1 = 23 + k
24This interval is non-empty if and only if k < 2.
25In the case that k ≥ 2, the inequality k < 23 + 23k is violated.
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and g′′k(
2
3
+ k) = 12 − 84k − 36k2 < 0 for k > 1
6
(
√
61 − 7) ≃ 0.135. When k > 0.135,
g′′k(p1) < 0 for p1 ∈ (23 + k, 1 + k) and hence g′k is decreasing for p1 ∈ (23 + k, 1 + k). Since
g′k(
2
3
+ k) = −4k2 (5 + k) < 0, this implies g′k(p1) < 0 for p1 ∈ (23 + k, 1 + k) and from
gk(
2
3
+k) < 0 we obtain gk(p1) < 0 for p1 ∈ (23 +k, 1+k). Thus gk(p1) = 0 has no solution
for p1 ∈ (23 + k, 1 + k) when k > 0.135.
When k ∈ (0, 0.135), we find that g′′k(p1) > 0 for p1 ∈ (23 + k, 23k + 13 + 19
√
12− 3k)
and g′′k(p1) < 0 for p1 ∈ (23k + 13 + 19
√
12− 3k, 1 + k). Therefore g′k is increasing for
p1 ∈ (23 + k, 23k + 13 + 19
√
12− 3k) and decreasing for p1 ∈ (23k + 13 + 19
√
12− 3k, 1 + k).
We find that g′k(
2
3
k+ 1
3
+ 1
9
√
12− 3k) = 8
9
(4− k)√12− 3k−12−4k2 < 0 for k > 0.0652,
which implies that gk(p1) = 0 has no solution for p1 ∈ (23 + k, 1 + k) when k > 0.0652.
When k ≤ 0.0652, if a solution exists then it is such that p1 > 23 , p > p1 + k.
Lemma 3 There exists no NE in which I plays mixed bundling.
Proof If I plays mixed bundling, then E1 and E2 play q1 = q2 with q1 + a smaller than
p− p1. Furthermore, by Lemma 2 q1 + a needs to be smaller than 0.0652. We prove that
these conditions fail to hold for any a > 0.
Since q1 + a < p− p1, it follows that 12p < p1 < p. Given q2 < p− p1− a, the profit of E1
from playing q1 < p− p1 − a is
πE1 = q1[A(SEI) +A(SEE)] = −q21 + (p+ pp1 + pq2 + pa− p1 − 2p1q2 − a−
1
2
p2 − 2p1a)q1
This function is maximized with respect to q1 in the interval [0, p− p1 − a) if and only if
q1 =
1
2
(p+ pp1+ pq2+ pa− p1− 2p1q2− a− 2p1a− 12p2) < p− p1− a. The same argument
applies to E2: given q1 and q2 smaller than p− p1 − a, the profit of E2 is
πE2 = q2[A(SIE) +A(SEE)] = −q22 + (p+ pp1 + pq1 + pa− p1 − 2p1q1 − a−
1
2
p2 − 2p1a)q2
and πE2 is maximized with respect to q2 in the interval [0, p − p1 − a) if and only if
q2 =
1
2
(p + pp1 + pq1 + pa − p1 − 2p1q1 − a − 12p2 − 2p1a) < p − p1 − a. From q1 = q2
we find q1 + a = q2 + a = h(p, p1) =
p
2
+ a−p1
2p1+2−p and we prove that this expression is
larger than 0.0652, which is inconsistent with I playing mixed bundling. First notice
that p < 1 + 2(q1 + a) in a mixed bundling equilibrium by Lemma 2, thus p < 2 since
q1+ a ≤ 0.0652. Since ∂h∂p1 =
p−2a−2
(2p1+2−p)2 , it follows that h is decreasing in p1 and h(p1, p) >
h(p, p) = p
2+2a
2p+4
as p1 < p. The latter expression is increasing in p (given that p >
2
3
),
hence p
2+2a
2p+4
> h(2
3
, 2
3
) = 1
12
+ 3
8
a > 0.0652 for any a ∈ [0, 1).
Lemma 4 The profile of strategies p = PBII , p1 high, p2 high, q1 = p
BI
E1, q2 = p
BI
E2
constitute a NE; each NE is outcome equivalent.
Proof Denote the equilibrium prices by pˆ, pˆ1, pˆ2, qˆ1, qˆ2. We know from Lemmas 1 and 3
that I plays pure bundling in each NE. That implies that given qˆ = qˆ1 = qˆ2, I plays
pˆ =
4
3
(qˆ + a) +
1
3
√
6 + 4(qˆ + a)2 (10)
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and pˆ1 ≥ pˆ− qˆ−a, pˆ2 ≥ pˆ− qˆ−a. However, the precise values of pˆ1, pˆ2 may be relevant. In
case that pˆ1 > pˆ− qˆ−a and pˆ2 > pˆ− qˆ−a, the profit function of E1 is 12(pˆ−q1− qˆ−2a)2q1
for q1 ≥ pˆ− pˆ1 − a and q1 = qˆ strictly satisfies this inequality. Thus it is necessary that
the first order condition for maximization of 1
2
(pˆ − q1 − qˆ − 2a)2q1 is satisfied at q1 = qˆ,
that is qˆ = 1
3
(pˆ− qˆ − 2a), or equivalently qˆ = 1
4
(pˆ− 2a). Combining with (10) we obtain
the equilibrium prices in Proposition 2.
Given qˆ = 1
10
(
√
10 + 4a2 − 2a), from Lemmas 1 and 2 we know that I’s best reply is
pure bundling with pˆ = 2
5
(3a+
√
10 + 4a2) since 0.0652 < qˆ+a < 1.543 for any a ∈ [0, 1).
Regarding the entrants, notice that if pˆ1 is not much larger than pˆ − qˆ − a, then a
conceivably profitable deviation for E1 consists of reducing q1, so that a few consumers
buy 1E2I . Likewise, a similar deviation may be profitable for E2. Moreover, if pˆ1, pˆ2
are large then no type of consumer is interested in buying 1I2E and 1E2I and rather
chooses between 1I2I and 1E2E. Therefore, pˆ =
2
5
(3a +
√
10 + 4a2), pˆ1 and pˆ2 high, and
qˆ = 1
10
(
√
10 + 4a2 − 2a) is a NE.
Now we show that no different equilibrium exists such that pˆ1 = pˆ − qˆ − a and
pˆ2 ≥ pˆ− qˆ−a by proving that a profitable deviation exists for entrant 2.26 We know that
for q2 slightly above qˆ, the profit of E2 is
1
2
(pˆ− qˆ − q2 − 2a)2q2 and its (right) derivative
at q2 = qˆ is α ≡ 12(pˆ − 2qˆ − 2a)(pˆ − 4qˆ − 2a). In equilibrium it is necessary that α ≤ 0,
and pˆ− 2qˆ − 2a > 0 given (10). Thus α ≤ 0 if and only if pˆ ≤ 4qˆ + 2a, or equivalently
qˆ ≥ 1
6
√
6 + 4(q + a)2 − 1
3
(qˆ + a) (11)
On the other hand, for q2 slightly below qˆ the profit of E2 is computed by evaluating
A(SIE) = (pˆ−pˆ1−q2−a)(1−pˆ1+qˆ+a) andA(SEE) = 12(2pˆ−pˆ1−qˆ−3a−2q2)(pˆ1−qˆ−a); thus
πE2 = q2(A(SIE)+A(SEE)) = −q22+(pˆ−pˆ1+ 12 pˆ21−pˆ1qˆ−a+aqˆ+ 12a2−pˆ1a+ 12 qˆ2)q2. The (left)
derivative of πE2 at q2 = qˆ is β ≡ −2qˆ+pˆ−pˆ1+ 12 pˆ21−pˆ1qˆ−a+aqˆ+ 12a2−pˆ1a+ 12 qˆ2, and taking
into account (10) and pˆ1 = pˆ−qˆ−a we obtain β = 13+ 49(qˆ+a)2− 29(qˆ+a)
√
6 + 4(qˆ + a)2−qˆ.
From (11) we infer that β ≤ 1
3
+ 4
9
(qˆ+ a)2− 2
9
(qˆ+ a)
√
6 + 4(qˆ + a)2− 1
6
√
6 + 4(q + a)2+
1
3
(qˆ + a), and we prove that the latter expression is negative; this implies that reducing
slightly q2 below qˆ is a profitable deviation exists for E2. Let k = q + a and notice
that 1
3
+ 4
9
k2 − 2
9
k
√
6 + 4k2 − 1
6
√
6 + 4k2 + 1
3
k < 0 is equivalent to (1
3
+ 4
9
k2 + 1
3
k)2 <
((2
9
k + 1
6
)
√
6 + 4k2)2, which reduces to 2
9
k + 1
18
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) The inequality ΠBII > 2π
II
I is equivalent to
4
125
(a2 + 10)
√
10 + 4a2 > 2
9
(2 + a)2 −
8
125
a (20− a2), in which the right hand side is positive for every a ∈ [0, 1). Squaring both
26The case in which pˆ1 > pˆ− qˆ − a and pˆ2 = pˆ− qˆ − a is dealt with likewise, considering entrant 1.
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sides yields the equivalent inequality 2368
10125
+ 1408
2025
a+ 224
3375
a2+ 608
10125
a3+ 188
2025
a4− 32
1125
a5 > 0,
which holds for any a ∈ [0, 1) since 2368
10125
> 32
1125
.
(ii) The inequality πBIE1 < π
II
E1 is equivalent to
1
250
(8a2 + 5)
√
10 + 4a2 < 1
9
(1 − a)2 +
1
125
a (8a2 + 15), and squaring both sides we obtain the equivalent inequality f(a) ≡ 169
20250
−
46
2025
a + 14
675
a2 − 86
10125
a3 − 163
10125
a4 + 16
1125
a5 > 0, with f(0) = 169
20250
> 0, f(1) = − 1
250
< 0.
Furthermore, f ′(a) = 2
10125
(1− a) (−115 + 95a− 34a2 − 360a3) < 0 for any a ∈ [0, 1) and
thus a unique solution to f(a) = 0 exists; numerical methods suggest that the solution is
about 0.54623.
Proof of Proposition 5
The first order conditions are 1 − Fn(p¯I − p¯E − a) − p¯IF ′n(p¯I − p¯E − a) = 0 and
Fn(p¯I − p¯E − a)− 1npEiF ′n(p¯I − p¯E − a) = 0 for i = 1, ..., n. Using δ ≡ p¯I − p¯E − a we can
write them as
1− Fn(δ)− p¯IF ′n(δ) = 0,
Fn(δ)− 1
n
pEiF
′
n(δ) = 0 for i = 1, ..., n
Add up the FOC for the n entrants and obtain nF (δ) − p¯EF ′(δ) = 0. Subtracting the
latter equation from the FOC for the incumbent yields (6).
Let δ¯n be such that Fn(δ¯n) =
1
n+1
. Then there is no solution to (6) for δ > δ¯n since
F ′n(δ) > 0. However, a unique solution δˆn exists in (0, δ¯n) because δ¯n <
1
2
and both Fn
and F ′n are strictly increasing in (0, δ¯n).
Given δˆn, the equilibrium prices p
BI
I , p
BI
E1, ..., p
BI
En are straightforward to obtain.
Proof of Proposition 6
Assume that x1, ..., xn i.i.d., each with support [0, 1], expectation µ and standard
deviation σ. For large n we replace the c.d.f. of x¯n with its normal approximation. We
denote with Φn the c.d.f. of a normal random variable with expectation µ and standard
deviation σn ≡ σ√n ; then Φ′n(x) = 1σ
√
n
2π
e−
n
2
(x−µ
σ
)2 and Φn(x) =
∫ x
−∞
1
σ
√
n
2π
e−
n
2
( z−µ
σ
)2dz.
Thus we consider
(n+ 1)Φn(δ) + (δ + a)Φ
′
n(δ) = 1 (12)
instead of (6). For each n, there exists a unique solution δˆn to (12), and δˆn ∈ (0, µ). For
a general sequence {an}, we write an → L instead of limn→+∞ an = L.
The proof is organized in two lemmas. In the first one we prove that (12) yields the
equilibrium prices only for finitely many n. In the second one we find the equilibrium
prices when n is large.
Lemma 1 For a large n, p¯I as derived in Proposition 5 is larger than u; thus the prices
in Proposition 5 are not the equilibrium prices.
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We prove in two steps that p¯I → +∞.
Step 1 For any large n, δˆn < δ˜n ≡ µ− σn
√
3
2
lnn.
We start by proving that (n + 1)Φn(δ˜n) → +∞, and in order to do this we notice that
Φn(δ˜n) = Φ
s(−
√
3
2
lnn) =
∫ +∞√
3
2
lnn
1√
2π
e−
1
2
x2dx, in which Φs is the c.d.f. of a standard
Normal random variable; the second equality holds since the density of the standard
normal random variable is symmetric around 0. Thus (n+ 1)Φn(δ˜n) =
1√
2π
∫ +∞√
3
2 lnn
e−
1
2x
2
dx
1
n+1
and in order to evaluate the limit of this expression as n → +∞ we can treat n as a
continuous variable and apply l’Hopital’s rule. Then we obtain
− 1√
2π
e
−12 (
√
3
2 lnn)
2
1√
2 lnn
1
n
− 1
(n+1)2
,
which is equal to (n+1)
2
n7/4
√
4π lnn
→ +∞. Since the left hand side of (12) is increasing with
respect to δ ∈ [0, µ], we infer that the inequality δˆn < δ˜n holds for any large n, otherwise
(12) is violated.
Step 2 p¯I → +∞.
From the inequality δˆn < δ˜n we can prove that Φ
′
n(δˆn) → 0: it suffices to notice that
(i) Φ′n(δ) is increasing with respect to δ ∈ [0, µ], thus Φ′n(δˆn) < Φ′n(δ˜n); (ii) Φ′n(δ˜n) =
1
σ
√
n
2π
e−
n
2σ2
σ2n
3
2
lnn = 1
σ
√
2π
√
n
→ 0.
Since Φ′n(δˆn)→ 0, it follows from (12) that (n+ 1)Φn(δˆn)→ 1 and thus Φn(δˆn)→ 0.
Finally, p¯I =
1−Φn(δˆn)
Φ′n(δˆn)
→ +∞ since Φn(δˆn)→ 0 and Φ′n(δˆn)→ 0.
Lemma 2 For a large n, the unique equilibrium is such that p¯I = u and p¯E is about
1
2
(u − a − µ) + 1
2
√
(u− a+ µ)2 + 4σ2. The market share of I tends to 1, therefore his
profit per product tends to the monopoly price u.
For a large n there exists no equilibrium in which I plays p¯I = u, thus p¯I = u in any
equilibrium. First we investigate the entrants’ behavior given p¯I = u, and then we prove
that p¯I = u is a best reply for I given the entrants’ behavior.
Step 1 Given p¯I = u, for a large n the entrants play p¯E ∈ (u− a− 12 , u− a) such that p¯E
is about equal to 1
2
(u− a− µ) + 1
2
√
(u− a+ µ)2 + 4σ2.
Consumers buy the bundle of the entrants if and only if x¯n ≤ u − p¯E − a. Thus πEi =
pEiΦn(u− p¯E − a) and the first order conditions reduce to
gn(α) = u− a− α (13)
in which α ≡ u − p¯E − a and gn(α) ≡ nΦn(α)Φ′n(α) = n
Φs(α−µ
σ
√
n)
1
σ
√
n
2π
e−
n
2 (
α−µ
σ )
2 =
σ
∫ +∞
µ−α
σ
√
n
e−
1
2 t
2
dt
1√
n
e−
n
2 (
α−µ
σ )
2 . It
is useful to prove that gn(α) → σ2µ−α for any α ∈ [0, µ); to this end, we can treat n as
a continuous variable and apply l’Hopital’s rule. Then we obtain
µ−α√
n
1√
n3
+ 1√
n
(µ−α
σ
)2
, which
converges to σ
2
µ−α .
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Now we consider (13) and notice that gn(0)→ σ2µ ≤ 1,27 u−a > 1, and gn(µ) = σ
√
π
2
n;
thus we infer that there exists a solution to (13) in (0, µ) for a large n. Moreover, since
any normal distribution is log concave, it follows that the left hand side is increasing
in α while the right hand side is decreasing; thus there exists a unique solution αˆn to
(13). Precisely, let αˆ ≡ 1
2
(u − a + µ) − 1
2
√
(u− a− µ)2 + 4σ2 be the unique solution to
σ2
µ−α = u − a − α which is smaller than µ; then αˆn → αˆ and p¯E is close to u − a − αˆ =
1
2
(u−a−µ)+ 1
2
√
(u− a+ µ)2 + 4σ2 for a large n, which implies that u−a−µ < p¯E < u−a.
Step 2 Given p¯E between u− a−µ and u− a, for a large n the best reply of I is p¯I = u.
Given that each entrant plays p¯E between u − µ − a and u − a, the demand for the
bundle of I is 1− Φn(p¯I − p¯E − a) if p¯I ≤ u (otherwise it is zero). Thus the profit of I is
ΠI = p¯I [1−Φn(p¯I − p¯E−a)], with dΠIdp¯I = 1−Φn(p¯I− p¯E−a)− p¯IΦ′n(p¯I − p¯E−a) which is
decreasing in p¯I . Since u− a−µ < p¯E < u− a, we find that 0 < u− p¯E − a < µ and thus
Φn(u − p¯E − a) → 0, Φ′n(u − p¯E − a) → 0. Therefore dΠIdp¯I > 0 at p¯I = u and this implies
that p¯I = u is a best reply for u. The market share of I, 1− Φn(u− p¯E − a), tends to 1.
Proof of Proposition 7
(i) Given PE, we can argue as in the proof of Proposition 2 to prove that I plays
PI between PE + 2a and PE + 2a + 1, and that ΠI is maximized with respect to PI at
PI =
2
3
(PE + 2a) +
1
3
√
6 + (PE + 2a)2. Since we have just proved that the equilibrium
prices satisfy PE + 2a < PI < PE + 2a + 1, the profit function of the entrant is ΠE =
1
2
(PI−2a−PE)2PE for prices close to equilibrium prices. Therefore the first order condition
for maximization of ΠE with respect to PE needs to be satisfied: PI − 3PE − 2a = 0, and
combining with PI =
2
3
(PE + 2a) +
1
3
√
6 + (PE + 2a)2 we obtain P
BB
I , P
BB
E .
In order to verify that PBBI , P
BB
E is an equilibrium, we show that P
BB
E is a best reply
for E given PBBI .
28 The demand for the bundle of the entrant is 0 if PE ≥ PBBI − 2a =
3
4
(
√
a2 + 2 − a), it is 1
2
(PBBI − PE − 2a)2 if PBBI − 2a − 1 ≤ PE < PBBI − 2a, and it is
1− 1
2
(2−PBBI + PE +2a)2 if PBBI − 2a− 2 ≤ PE < PBBI − 2a− 1. However, if a ≥ 112 we
find that PBBI − 2a− 1 ≤ 0, and thus E needs to choose PE between 0 and PBBI − 2a; in
this case the optimal PE is P
BB
E . If a <
1
12
, then ΠE = PE[1 − 12(2 − PBBI + PE + 2a)2]
for PE < P
BB
I − 2a− 1, with dΠEdPE = −32P 2E + (32
√
a2 + 2− 3
2
a− 4)PE − 2516 − 32a− 916a2 +
9
16
a
√
a2 + 2 + 3
2
√
a2 + 2 which is positive for any PE ∈ [0, PBBI − 2a − 1]. Thus also in
this case the optimal PE is P
BB
E .
(ii) The incumbent’s market share is 1 − 1
2
(PBBI − PBBE − 2a)2, which is 14(3 − a2 +
a
√
a2 + 2). It is simple to see that 1
4
(3 − a2 + a√a2 + 2) is increasing and 1
4
(3 − a2 +
27The inequality σ2 ≤ µ holds since µ = E(x), σ2 = E(x2) − µ2, and E(x) ≥ E(x2) given that the
support is [0, 1].
28Regarding I, we have proved above that PBB
I
is a best reply for I given PBB
E
.
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a
√
a2 + 2) ≥ 3
4
for any a ∈ [0, 1). The equilibrium profits are ΠBBI = 14(3 − a2 +
a
√
a2 + 2)PBBI and Π
BB
E = (1− 14(3− a2 + a
√
a2 + 2))PBBE .
(iii) The average cost borne by consumers is
∫ PBBI −PBBE −2a
0
∫ PBBI −PBBE −2a−x1
0
(2a+ x1 +
x2)dx2dx1 +Π
BB
I +Π
BB
E , which is equal to
3
8
a+ 1
12
a3 + (17
24
− 1
12
a2)
√
a2 + 2 and is smaller
than the cost in the case BI.
Proof of Proposition 10
The first order conditions are 1 − Fn(p¯I − p¯E − a) − p¯IF ′n(p¯I − p¯E − a) = 0 and
Fn(p¯I − p¯E − a)− p¯EF ′n(p¯I − p¯E − a) = 0. Using δ ≡ p¯I − p¯E − a we can write them as
1− Fn(δ)− p¯IF ′n(δ) = 0,
Fn(δ)− p¯EF ′n(δ) = 0
Subtracting the FOC for the entrant from the FOC of the incumbent we obtain (7). Notice
that there is no solution to (7) for δ > 1
2
since F ′n(δ) > 0 and 2Fn(δ) > 1. However, a
unique solution δˆn exists in (0,
1
2
) because both Fn and F
′
n are strictly increasing in (0,
1
2
)
and the left hand side of (7) has value 1 + (1
2
+ a)F ′n(
1
2
) > 1 at δ = 1
2
.
Proof of Proposition 11
(i) Assume that x1, ..., xn i.i.d., each with support [0, 1], expectation µ and standard
deviation σ. For large n we replace the c.d.f. of x¯n with its normal approximation. We
denote with Φn the c.d.f. of a normal random variable with expectation µ and standard
deviation σn ≡ σ√n ; then Φ′n(x) = 1σ
√
n
2π
e−
n
2
(x−µ
σ
)2 and Φn(x) =
∫ x
−∞
1
σ
√
n
2π
e−
n
2
( z−µ
σ
)2dz.
Thus we consider
2Φn(δ) + (δ + a)Φ
′
n(δ) = 1 (14)
instead of (7). For each n, there exists a unique solution δˆn to (14), and δˆn ∈ (0, µ). For
a general sequence {an}, we write an → L instead of limn→+∞ an = L.
We start by proving that δˆn → µ. Given an arbitrary ε > 0, consider δ = µ−ε and notice
that (i) (µ− ε+ a)Φ′n(µ− ε)→ 0; (ii) Φn(µ− ε)→ 0. Thus for any ε > 0 the inequality
δˆn > µ− ε holds for a large n; this reveals that δˆn → µ.
Given an arbitrary k > 0, the equation Φ′n(δ) = k has a unique solution in (0, µ) which
is δ˜n,k ≡ µ − σn
√
ln 1
2πk2σ2n
. Furthermore, if we consider k > 1
µ+a
then we infer that
δˆn < δ˜n,k for any large n, otherwise (14) is violated. Therefore Φn(δˆn) < Φn(δ˜n,k) =
Φs(−
√
ln 1
2πk2σ2n
), in which Φs is the c.d.f. of a standard Normal random variable. Since
Φs(−
√
ln 1
2πk2σ2n
)→ 0, it follows that Φn(δˆn)→ 0. In view of (14) we infer that Φ′n(δˆn)→
1
µ+a
and thus p¯E =
Φn(δˆn)
Φ′n(δˆn)
→ 0, p¯I = 1−Φn(δˆn)Φ′n(δˆn) → µ+ a.
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(ii) It is straightforward to see that 1
2
+ a > 1
9
(2 + a)2 for any a ∈ [0, 1). Furthermore,
the inequality u− (4
9
a+ 11
18
− 1
18
a2) > u− (1
2
+ a) is equivalent to 5
9
a+ 1
18
a2− 1
9
> 0, which
holds if and only if a > 0.19615.
Proof of Proposition 12
Given p¯E, we can argue like in various other proofs to show that I plays p¯I between
a+ p¯E and a+ p¯E + 1, thus ΠI = n(1 + a− p¯I + p¯E)p¯I. The optimal p¯I as a function of
p¯E is p¯I =
1
2
(1 + a + p¯E) if this expression is larger than a + p¯E, otherwise the optimal
p¯I is a + p¯E. However, it is impossible that p¯I = a + p¯E and p¯E > 0 in equilibrium, as
then each entrant makes no profit and has an incentive to reduce slightly his price. Thus
a+ p¯E < p¯I < a+ p¯E + 1 in equilibrium, and thus πEi = (pI − p¯E − a)pEi prices close to
equilibrium prices. Therefore the first order condition for maximization of πEi needs to
hold: (pI − p¯E − a) − 1npEi = 0 for i = 1, ..., n. Combining with p¯I = 12(1 + a + p¯E) we
obtain pBICE = n
1−a
2+n
, pI =
a+n+1
2+n
and thus PBICI =
a+n+1
2+n
.
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